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MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD OF WAH'S TALK WITH GOVERNOR CARTER,
TUESDAY MORNING, AUGUST 31ST, 1976

I called on Governor Carter at the home of Dr. Peter Bourne in Washington. We had a talk of about 45 minutes. Dick Holbrooke was present throughout the talk. Peter Bourne came in toward the end of the talk; however, he did not participate.

I had a chance to express my views about the almost psychopathic fears that some people have of the conceivable actions that the Russians might take in a nuclear first strike against us instead of making an analysis of what is rationally probable. I feel that we will destroy ourselves unless we follow that course. Also the Russians think they are winning in the peaceful ^{negotiation} ~~competition~~. I said that Mr. Brezhnev's speech on the occasion of the 30th Anniversary of VE Day last year stated that nuclear war would destroy the attacker as well and that the stockpiling of mass destruction weapons is becoming evermore absurd. I also mentioned to Governor Carter that this obsession-with "keeping up with what the Russians might do" is ridiculous. Every year we, on our part, bring out something new and this frightens them and only escalates the problem. I feel that we are so far ahead of them scientifically that even if they do something drastic we could react quickly. We can afford to wait and see what they do.

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I said I felt the time has come to consider, if negotiations were not productive, action such as Kennedy took in unilaterally offering restraint, particularly on the development of new weapons systems, as long as the Russians showed parallel restraints. The American people are entitled to full information on what we know about the Soviet systems and about what we are developing ourselves, except of course the classified information regarding warheads. The Pentagon gives out only what will scare Congress to make appropriations. Governor Carter seemed to agree generally with what I said.

Then we discussed Mr. Brezhnev. (I gave Gov. Carter a copy of the Memorandum of my conversations with General Secretary Brezhnev during our June 1974 meeting) ^{as before} I also gave ^{the} Governor Carter a copy of my book and asked him to read the two pages in the introduction about foreign policy. I said I felt that we had neglected the capabilities of our conventional forces. Our spending has been on scientific efforts in the strategic field, neglecting developing the best possible conventional equipment and forces. Governor Carter had mentioned the Reserves and National Guard, and I said that during the Korean War we found that they were not of any real value. He had spoken of his experiences with the Reserves and National Guard when he was Governor of Georgia and felt that they were

in good shape. I think this should be looked into to see if the situation has improved in other states. But I doubted it.

I told Governor Carter that I had been told by Tito that during Stalin's regime the Russians would be reluctant to use their own forces beyond the first tier of countries ^{countries they had occupied in 1945.} and would never use the Red Army against Yugoslavia. However, we cannot let them have an open field to walk into. They are more prone to let other satellite countries do their work for them, as in the case of North Korea and Cuba in Angola. Subversive action is the greatest danger. I mentioned Mr. Brezhnev's statements last year in his VE speech in May 1975 and at the 25th Communist Party Congress, that they would continue to support the "high-principled" liberation movements of the peoples in all parts of the world. I told him I thought the CIA should continue to gather the facts from around the world and take such action to protect our interests overtly if possible, but covertly if essential, in some cases. As an example, we had been in touch eleven years ago with rebels in Angola and Mozambique. Nixon got us out of Africa entirely, including Angola, but if we had stayed there we would have been there ahead of the Soviet influence. Our help there at that time was mostly for the refugees and for the education of a few of their brightest young men--nothing for weapons. Dean Rusk didn't approve of it all all, citing our alliance with Portugal. But we knew then that a revolt would take

place there eventually.

Brezhnev spoke about the need for continuing to work on detente--the relaxing of tensions. It would take a long time and much understanding on both sides. He sees the desirability of progress on a step-by-step basis and believes it is important that meetings continue with the President of the U.S. on a regular basis. Thus some constructive steps could be made at each meeting.

Governor Carter was very courteous and attentive throughout the talk. He asked questions and seemed to agree with most of what I said. He smiled when I called these people who were so overconcerned about the Soviet threat "psychopathic" and seemed to understand what I meant.

I asked Governor Carter what he wanted me to say to Brezhnev and Tito if I saw them. Dick Holbrooke took down the instructions he gave me for my meeting with Brezhnev. He said, as I recall, that agreement on SALT and the reduction of nuclear weapons and also continuous cooperation toward non-proliferation were the most urgent matters. He stated that he will be quite willing to meet with Mr. Brezhnev. He was very much interested in the emigration problem, especially concerning the Jews. As a general comment, our objective should

be to reduce the Soviet control and interference in the internal affairs of other countries.

As to my visit to Tito, he wants his opinion on how best to deal with the Eastern European countries and the Communist Parties in some Western countries. For my part, I suggested that we ask him what the significance was and the long-range effect of the East Berlin Conference held this year and what Brezhnev's promises mean. We should tell him that we want to do everything possible to keep Soviet influence out of Yugoslavia and ask what we should do. (One thing we should do is be strong for a united Yugoslavia.)

Dictated by phone September 1, 1976

WAH/mhc